IRR 101

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What is this about

- Just a refresher on how things work today
- Using RPKI in context of provisioning

Filtering recap

1) Reject RFC 1918 (private) IP space

- 2) Reject majority of Bogon/Private ASNs
- 3) Reject IXP Nets
- 4) Reject based on Peerlock rules

5) Allow what is registered in IRR, WHOIS, ... and RPKI?

6) Reject the rest

What is the IRR

- "Internet Routing Registry"
- What NTT uses as a source to generate per customer prefix filters
- Publicly available, to help debugging and provide transparency
- By making our source for filter generation publicly available, other parties can inspect what we take into consideration.

What sources are there?

- Sources offered by Regional Internet Registries (RIPE, APNIC, ARIN, etc)
- Sources operated by "third parties" (like RADB, NTT, etc)
- In total there are ~ 40 sources, but NTT only uses 14 of them
- The sources are **NOT** equal, some operate by different rules than others

A route object: the atom

\$ whois -h rr.ntt.net 192.147.168.0/24

route: 192.147.168.0/24
descr: Job Snijders
origin: AS15562
notify: job@instituut.net
mnt-by: MAINT-JOB
changed: job@ntt.net 20161003
source: NTTCOM

(only the bold lines are relevant in the process)

Generating a prefix filter

job@vurt ~\$ whois -h rr.ntt.net '!gAS15562'
A212

165.254.255.132/32 165.254.255.26/32 165.254.255.0/25 165.254.255.144/28 165.254.255.133/32 **192.147.168.0/24** 165.254.255.160/28 165.254.255.149/32 209.24.0.0/16 204.42.254.192/26 165.254.255.0/24 67.221.245.0/24 C job@vurt ~\$

Same example, with bgpq3

job@vurt ~\$ bgpq3 -h rr.ntt.net -1 AS15562-in AS15562 no ip prefix-list AS15562-in ip prefix-list AS15562-in permit 67.221.245.0/24 ip prefix-list AS15562-in permit 165.254.255.0/24 ip prefix-list AS15562-in permit 165.254.255.0/26 ip prefix-list AS15562-in permit 165.254.255.26/32 ip prefix-list AS15562-in permit 165.254.255.64/26 ip prefix-list AS15562-in permit 165.254.255.132/32 ip prefix-list AS15562-in permit 165.254.255.133/32 ip prefix-list AS15562-in permit 165.254.255.144/28 ip prefix-list AS15562-in permit 165.254.255.149/32 ip prefix-list AS15562-in permit 165.254.255.160/28 ip prefix-list AS15562-in permit 192.147.168.0/24 ip prefix-list AS15562-in permit 204.2.30.0/23 ip prefix-list AS15562-in permit 204.42.254.192/26 ip prefix-list AS15562-in permit 209.24.0.0/16

Grouping ASNs: AS-SETs

job@vurt ~\$ whois -h rr.ntt.net AS15562:AS-SNIJDERS

as-set:	AS15562:AS-S	NI	JDERS	
members:	AS15562	#	Me	
members:	AS57436	#	Samer	
members:	AS-KING	#	Thomas	King
members:	AS-NETHER	#	Jared	
tech-c:	DUMY-RIPE			
admin-c:	DUMY-RIPE			
notify:	job@instituu	ıt.	net	
org:	ORG-SNIJ1-RI	PE	ר ע	
mnt-by:	SNIJDERS-MNI	1		
created:	2018-01-16T1	7:	54:54Z	
last-modified:	2018-01-16T1	.7:	58:36Z	
source:	RIPE			

Systematic access to AS-SETS

\$ whois -h rr.ntt.net '!iAS15562:AS-SNIJDERS,1'
A130

AS15562 AS202539 AS205591 AS205593 AS206479 AS206499 AS206551 AS234 AS267 AS31451 AS41731 AS49697 AS51861 AS57436 AS60003 AS61438 C

\$ irrtree AS15562:AS-SNIJDERS

Processed: 0 objects (Elapsed Time: 0:00:00) IRRTree (1.1.3) report for 'AS15562:AS-SNIJDERS' (IPv4), using rr.ntt.net at 2018-01-24 16:23 AS15562:AS-SNIJDERS (16 ASNs, 25 pfxs)

- +-- AS-KING (12 ASNs, 8 pfxs)
 - +-- AS205591 (2 pfxs)
 - +-- AS206499 (2 pfxs)
 - +-- AS49697 (2 pfxs)
 - | +-- AS51861 (1 pfxs)
 - | +-- AS60003 (1 pfxs)
- +-- AS-NETHER (2 ASNs, 4 pfxs)
 - +-- AS267 (2 pfxs)
 - +-- AS234 (2 pfxs)
- **+--** AS15562 (12 pfxs)
- +-- AS57436 (1 pfxs)

Wrapping it up:

- An AS-SET is resolved into all its member ASNs
- For each ASN we do a reverse lookup to find all route-objects where the ASN is the "origin:"
- The total list of prefixes from the above 2 steps is the input into `bgpq3` and ends up on routers
- The order matters, more on that later

What when duplicate AS-SET?

- What if AS-STEALTH exists in multiple IRRs?
- AS-STEALTH exists in both RIPE and RADB
- The two are not managed by the same company

So.. that's what that 'sources' is about

← → C	gtools/netgeek/autnum/1
Home Configtools EMACS	ISIS Map Vendor Settings
ASN *	15562
Name *	snijders-as
IPv4 as-set	AS15562:AS-SNIJDERS
IPv6 as-set	AS15562:AS-SNIJDERS
Peertype *	customer •
Contacts	
Internet Routing Registry (IRR) Sources	RIPE,RADB,NTTCOM
ACL Mail	job@instituut.net
IPv4 Prefix Count	25

Order is important

\$ whois -h rr.ntt.net '!j-*' [Querving rr.ntt.net] [rr.ntt.net] A340 NTTCOM:Y:939977-949960:949958 INTERNAL: Y: 629-28859:28859 RADB:Y:3645499-3646474 RIPE:Y:40749570-40751305 ALTDB:Y:42283-44199 BELL: Y: 248417-248891 LEVEL3:Y:777495-777945 RGNET:Y:139-139 GT:Y:1004-4246 APNIC:Y:6317163-6324052 JPIRR:Y:108306-129968 ARTN: Y: 76179-79625 BBOT:Y:6715-6843 TC:Y:8802-17353 AFRINIC: Y: 635751-651232 ARTN-WHOTS:Y:0-84 С

Changing the order

- \$ bgpq3 -S RIPE,RADB -h rr.ntt.net -A AS-STEALTH | wc -l 175
- \$ bgpq3 -S RADB,RIPE -h rr.ntt.net -A AS-STEALTH | wc -l 1455

(bgpq3 is a small open source tool to generate prefix filters from the IRR, we don't use it, but if we would we'd have smaller configs ;-))

How one IRR source is unlike the other..

- Not all IRRs are equal
- They differ in terms of ownership, purpose, policy, validation
- All of IRR is "garbage in, garbage out"
- Some RIRs offer good training materials on how to use the IRR
- Some IRRs have fancy web interfaces, some require interaction via email

- In NTTCOM, any customer can create any route object for any prefix (if it hasn't been covered by another route object in NTTCOM)
- In RADB anyone that pays \$500 per year can create any route object for any prefix (if it hasn't been covered by another route object in RADB)


- In ARIN, any ARIN member can create any route object for any prefix (if it hasn't been covered by another route object in ARIN)
- In ARIN WHOIS, only the owner of the IP block can specify an Origin AS

- In RIPE, only the owner of the IP block can create/designate route objects. Except when it isn't RIPE managed space... then anyone can create any route object for any prefix (if it hasn't been covered by another route object in RIPE)
- In the future RIPE will show the difference between route-objects for which it is authoritative and and which ones it isn't by showing: "source: RIPE" and "source: RIPE-NONAUTH"

- In the RIPE database, when you create route objects, both the IP block owner and the owner of the Origin ASN have to approve it. So double authentication is required.
- This is going to change in 2018, only the IP owner has to approve: aligns with APNIC, others

- In the APNIC and AfriNIC database you can only create route-objects for APNIC/AfriNIC managed space **AND** with approval from the IP block owner, and no approval from the ASN owner.
- This is the most sane approach, cleanest data
- JPIRR requires you to reconfirm a route object every year

Summary: what the F***



What is this ARIN WHOIS thing?

 Remember from the fifth slide that we only care about the CIDR + Origin AS tuple?

	View & Manage Network			
Bashboard	tion a manage trentent			
Tickets & Messages 👩 🝷		_		
Your Account	Information			
Settings Profile and security information	NETWORK INFO			
Point of Contact records View and manage POCs	Net Range: 198.51.100.0 - 198.51.100.255 CIDR: 198.51.100.0/24			
Organization Identifiers View and manage Org IDs	Origin AS: AS19384 Net Name: TEST-NET-2			
Associations Report Records connected to your account	Net Handle: NET-198-51-100-0 Parent: NET-198-51-100-0			
IP Addresses	Public Comments: THIS NETWORK IS NON-PORTABLE			
Search View and manage your networks	Registered Date: 09-26-2008 15:36:10 Last Modified Date: 09-26-2008 15:36:10	/		

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Using ARIN WHOIS

- It is a trustworthy authoritative source of data
- We download a 3.5GB XML dump from ARIN once a day
- We convert the XML into "route:" objects
- We load those IRR objects into rr.ntt.net
- This is to offer customers easier choices
 - Setting up IRR can be cumbersome

Example output

\$ whois -h rr.ntt.net 199.43.0.44 199.43.0.0/24 route: NET-199-43-0-0-1 descr: origin: AS10745 This route object represents authoritative remarks: data retrieved from ARIN's WHOIS service. The original data can be found here: remarks: https://whois.arin.net/rest/net/NET-199-43-0-0 - 1This route object is the result of an remarks: automated WHOIS-to-IRR conversion process. mnt-by: MAINT-JOB job@ntt.net 20150715 changed: ARIN-WHOIS source:

Filter generation time schedule

01:00 UTC - NTT ACL generator and ACL pre-generator are run and ingest from IRRd (rr.ntt.net)

04:00 UTC - the newly generated ACLs are loaded into NTT AS 2914 border routers

06:00 UTC - ARIN starts creation of the full ARIN WHOIS database dump

12:00 UTC - irrexplorer.nlnog.net fetches & processes ARIN WHOIS database dump from ARIN

12:30 UTC - ARIN WHOIS data is loaded into IRRd at rr.ntt.net / rr1.ntt.net

http://irrexplorer.nlnog.net

$\leftarrow \ \Rightarrow$	C irrexplorer.nlnog	.net/searc	h/AS3333			☆ 📮	v 🕘 😨	0	
	Search AS Number: AS3333								
	Prefixes	bgp 🍦	ripe_managed 🌲	rpki	ripe 🌢	radb 🛊	advice		
	193.0.0/21	3333	0	3333	3333		Perfect		
	193.0.10.0/23	3333	0	3333	3333		Perfect		
	193.0.12.0/23	3333	0	3333	3333		Perfect		
	193.0.18.0/23	3333	0	3333	3333		Perfect		
	193.0.20.0/23	3333	0	3333	3333		Perfect		
	193.0.22.0/23	3333	0	3333	3333		Perfect		
	193.0.24.0/21	2121	0	2121,45678,60330	2121	2121	Proper RIPE	D	
	193.0.24.0/22		0	3333,45678,60330			Route object	cts	
	193.0.24.0/23		0	2121,3333,45678,60330			Route object	cts	
	103 0 24 0/24		•	2121 2222 45678 60220			Route object		

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New use case for RPKI data?

- A RPKI ROA kind of looks like a route object
- It has a "prefix" and an "origin"
- RPKI is trustworthy data, we know for sure that the owner of the IP space created the ROA

New use case for RPKI data?

← → C ③ Not secure localcert.ripe.net:8088/roas					☆ 🔽 I		
RPKI Validator	Home	Trust Anchors	ROAs	Ignore Filters	Whitelist	BGP Preview	Export and

Validated ROAs

Validated ROAs from APNIC from AFRINIC RPKI Root, APNIC from ARIN RPKI Root, APNIC from IANA RP LACNIC RPKI Root, APNIC from RIPE RPKI Root, ARIN RPKI Root, AfriNIC RPKI Root, LACNIC RPKI Roo NCC Pilot (RRDP prefetch), RIPE NCC RPKI Root, RIPE NCC RPKI Root (RRDP prefetch), RIPE NCC prej prepdev (RRDP prefetch), altca, apnic-testbed.

S	how 10 v entries Search: 2					
	ASN 🔺	Prefix 🔶	Maximum Length	Trust Anchor		
	15562	2001:67c:208c::/48	48	RIPE NCC RPKI Root		

Simple example

job@vurt ~\$ ftp -VM -o - \setminus

http://localcert.ripe.net:8088/export.json \

| jq '.roas[] | select(.asn | contains("AS15562"))? | .prefix' \

| uniq

"2001:67c:208c::/48"

job@vurt ~\$

Using RPKI data: rtrsub

\leftarrow \rightarrow C G itHub, Inc. [US] https://github	.com/job/rtrsub		@☆ 🗗 🛯	🕘 🧛 i	
This repository Search	Pull	requests Issues	Marketplace	e Explore	
⊑ job / rtrsub ï≡ -			C	Unwatch 🗸	
<> Code () Issues 1 () Pu	II requests 0	Boards 🛛 🕍 Repo	orts 📗 Projec	cts 💿 🗉	
RTR Substitution					
🕞 63 commits	រ្វិ 1 branch	S≥ 22 releases	s 11	1 contributc	
Branch: master New pull reques	st	C	reate new file	Upload files	
job bump version					
Trsub	bump version				
template-examples	make better use	make better use of the native bird rpki functions			
.gitignore	improve bird ter	nplate			

Future work #1

- Currently working with NIC.MX and NIC.BR for WHOIS access
- Continue to search for new quality data sources

Future work #2

- Going to IETF, to define "AS-SETs in RPKI"
 - Design goal: avoid collisions & autodiscovery
- Write a new IRRd from scratch: IRRdv4
 - Have better admin capabilities
 - Allow for innovation, integration with the RIRs

NLNOG Camp – June 1-3 Netherlands

