How much RPKI do you want in your BGP? **RPKI-Aware BGP Communities and related issues**

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Who am 1?

- Past RIPE NCC and Internet Society
- CHIX and IXP.ge NOC
- RIPE PC, Euro-IX PC, DKNOG PC
- SwiNOG Board
- Italian FreeBSD Users Group (GUFI)
- Run AS58280





What is this talk about?

There is what seems to be a problem

• We are proposing a BCP Document at the IETF to moderate it







Elements of RPKI




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Validating Verifying others



What is in a ROA?



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
·····▶ The network for which you are creating the ROA

·····▶ The ASN supposed to originate the BGP Announcement

The maximum prefix length that ROA is authorised to



RPKI - ROAs




IPv4


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IPv6




Relying Party











BETTER ROUTING DECISIONS


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BGP Announcements

AS111	10.0.8.0/22
AS222	10.0.6.0/24
AS333	10.4.16.0/20
AS111	10.0.12.0/22
AS111	10.0.16.0/22
AS111	10.0.20.0/22



RPKI Validation States



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Communities

- Community is a tagging technique to mark a set of routes
 - 32-bit integer which is attached to a BGP route as an optional transitive attribute

as-number:community-value

- Multiple communities can be attached to one route
- Well-known (hard-coded) communities exist: www.iana.org/assignments/bgp-well-known-communities





Large Communities

- A simple approach continuing along the standard communities
 - 96-bit integer which is attached to a BGP route as an optional transitive attribute
 - 3x 32-bit addressing space

as-number:function:parameter

- Larger fields, more fields, and a clean namespace separation
- 32-bit ASN clean solution



Problem statement

There seem to be operators using communities to carry RPKI ROV information

whole Internet

in the DFZ?

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• Communities are a transitive attribute, so chances are they are carried along to the

• What happens when ROV state changes for a prefix ? Can we see related updates







Outdated documentation

There is outdated documentation out there

- Some even still recommending to install the RIPE NCC Validator
 - It was abandoned years ago



• I have approached the responsible parties of what I could find in order to update it









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On with the data

- First stage, using BGPKit
 - Preliminary data was gathered using BGPStream

Communities carrying RPKI data come along


Take a random RIB output from routeviews and check to see if some known BGP





BGP Communities with RPKI meaning

- 1299:430 (RPKI state Valid)
- 1299:431 (RPKI state Unknown)
- 3356:901 (RPKI Valid)
- 3356:902 (RPKI Invalid)
- 3356:903 (RPKI Not Found)





Routeviews3 on 27/10/2023 at 22:00

Collecting of	data	a fr	om
Total entrie	es:	v4	260
Occurrences	of	335	6:9
Occurrences	of	335	6:9
Occurrences	of	335	6:9
Occurrences	of	129	9 : 4
Occurrences	of	129	9 : 4

- Good news! No 3359:902 (hence, no invalids are propagated)
- But, no visibility of anything from AS1299

routeviews3: 076029 - v6 2263807901 v4: 1686136 - v6: 1693 902 v4: 0 - v6: 0 903 v4: 2241052 - v6: 1199 430 v4: 0 - v6: 0 431 v4: 0 - v6: 0



Routeviews6 on 27/10/2023 at 22:00

- Collecting data from routeviews6
- Total entries: v4 0 v6 4655520
- Occurrences of 3356:901 v4: 0 v6: 312089
- Occurrences of 3356:902 v4: 0 v6: 0
- Occurrences of 3356:903 v4: 0 v6: 279334
- Occurrences of 1299:430 v4: 0 v6: 16154
- Occurrences of 1299:431 v4: 0 v6: 16028

AS3359 is more visible than AS1299 from here, but we do have some entries.

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BGP Updates


• If we see these communities in the RIB, they must be also in BGP Updates

World

So let's check how many BGP updates in a 24h period have these communities

• We are going to use RIPE RIS Live using a series of route collectors around the






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


BGP Communities in updates on RRC0 IPv4

with target communities



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22

Using a test prefix

- BGP
 - This will also help me check if other operators have special communities

I have setup 2a0f:fd00::/29 announced by AS58280

- I have a script to update the ROA every 6 hours, either adding or removing
- And a specific filter

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• Let's see if announcing a prefix, and changing ROV status for it tricks updates in





Results from test prefix

- Nothing visible from AS1299 or AS3356
- spotted Coloclue having a specific community

Tue, Jan 30, 2024 6:05 PM - New update on RRC03 for 2a0f:fd00::/29 with communities

Tue, Jan 30, 2024 11:01 AM - New update on RRC03 for 2a0f:fd00::/29 with communities [8283, 1], [8283, 101], [65101, 33152], [65102, 33000], [65103, 756], [65104, 150]]

And documenting it in RPSL

remarks:	+	+
remarks:	8283:101 828	33:5:1 Accepted
remarks:	8283:102 828	33:5:2 Accepted
remarks:	8283:104 828	33:5:4 Accepted
remarks:	+	+

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- [8283, 1], [8283, 101], [8283, 102], [65101, 33152], [65102, 33000], [65103, 756], [65104, 150]]

d from peer because of valid IRR entry d from peer because of valid ROA d while RPKI invalid because it is added to our whitelist



Conclusions

• There is definitely a number of operators signalling RPKI ROV State in BGP Communities

- The amount of noise this generates in BGP is notable, although contained
 - With more and more operators enabling ROV, this noise might increase

- We need some BCP document to recommend _not_ doing it
 - Or at least, suggests removing these communities on most BGP Sessions
 - And not propagating them



BCOP Draft

 "Guidance to Avoid Carrying RPKI Validation State in Transitive BGP Path Attributes"

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https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-spaghetti-sidrops-avoid-rpki-state-in-bgp/



Future work

- Expand work to include Large Communities
 - Implemented a simple, lightweight BGP Message parser to do it on RIS Live

- - Check their documentation or RPSL

Repeat the prefix test but including large communities

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A lot of manual intervention is required to check communities with the operator



Questions ?

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